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Serrano Il-A Case of
Missed Opportunities?
by JAMES W. BRIGGS*,
DONOVAN M. MAIN**
Introduction
Two opportunities were presented to the California Supreme Court
when Serrano v. Priest (Serrano H1) came before it for the second time.
These were: (1) an opportunity to establish sound criteria for determining
whether a school financing system satisfies state equal protection require-
ments, and (2) an opportunity to establish an appropriate standard of judicial
review to be applied in equal protection cases. This commentary will
explore the manner in which the court lost these opportunities by failing to
solve the school financing dilemma. Part I reviews the challenged finance
system. Part II analyzes the constitutional test developed by the California
Supreme Court in the two Serrano v. Priest opinions. 2 Parts I and IV
discuss the first and second opportunities, respectively, and the problems
that remain because those opportunities were avoided by -the court.
I. The Challenged School Financing System
Full appreciation of the constitutional issues involved in the Serrano
opinions requires an understanding of the basic framework of the challenged
school financing system. Although Serrano 11 describes the system with a
fair degree of accuracy, it does so in a way that obscures important
features that must be understood in order fully to comprehend the defend-
ants' proposed alternative test for constitutionality. 3 California, like most
* B.S., 1945, University of Washington; J.D., 1950, Stanford Law School; member,
California bar. Division Chief, Schools Division, Office of the Los Angeles County Counsel,
California.
** A.B., 1966, Occidental College; J.D., 1969, University of Southern California Law
Center; member, California bar. Deputy County Counsel, County of Los Angeles, California.
Both of the authors represented the defendants in the Serrano case.
1. 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345(1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3822
(U.S. June 15, 1977).
2. Serrano 1, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971); Serrano II, 18 Cal. 3d
728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976).
3. For the sake of brevity and clarity, some of the more important abbreviations and
terms that will be used in describing California's school financing system are defined as
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states, utilizes a "foundation program" system of financing its public
schools.4 Under California's system, the sources of current operating reve-
nue for each district are of three types: foundation program revenue,
categorical aids funds, and local supplements.
A. Foundation Program Revenue
Foundation program revenue consists of three types of funds. Basic aid
is an allocation made by the state to each school district in the amount of
$125 per ADA,5 $120 of which is required by the California Constitution.
6
These allocations are made to each district, regardless of its wealth. District
aid (D. Aid) represents the expected contribution of a district toward the
achievement of its foundation program. 7 District aid is in direct proportion
to the district's wealth. It is computed by determining the amount of tax
revenue that would be generated by applying a hypothetical tax rate
(known as the computational tax rate) to the modified assessed valuation
(MAV) of taxable property in the district. Commencing with the 1973-74
school year, the computational tax rates have been $2.23 per $100 of
assessed valuation for elementary districts and $1.64 per $100 for high
school districts.8 Since each unified school district is treated for school
finance purposes as a combined elementary and high school district, the
computational tax rate for a unified school district has accordingly been
$3.87 for each $100 of assessed valuation. If a particular district is suffi-
follows: (I) ADA means units of average daily attendance in one or more school districts. This
figure is computed by adding together the number of students counted present on each school
day and dividing that sum by the number of days school was taught. In practice, ADA
approximates 98% of pupil enrollment. Because of this rough equivalence, the reference herein
to figures on a per-pupil basis means per unit of ADA. (2) AV means assessed valuation of
taxable property in a school district. The legislature has directed every assessor to assess all
property subject to general property taxation at 25% of its full value. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §
401 (West Supp. 1977). (3) MAV means assessed valuation modified by the so-called Collier
Factor (an averaging mechanism used to equalize statewide property assessments), adopted by
the State Board of Equalization each year to conform the varying practices of the county
assessors to the statewide average assessment level. See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 41200-41206
(West Spec. Pamph. 1976) (formerly id. §§ 17261-17265 (West Supp. 1977)). (4) "School district
wealth" means a district's modified assessed valuation per unit of average daily attendance
(MAV/ADA).
4. Through this foundation program, the state supplements local taxes in order to provide
"for essential educational opportunities for all those who attend public schools." CAL. EDUC.
CODE § 14000 (West Spec. Pamph. 1976) (formerly id. § 17300 (West Supp. 1977)).
5. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 41790, 41800 (West Spec. Pamph. 1976) (formerly id. §§ 17751,
17801 (West Supp. 1977).
6. CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 6, para. 4.
7. See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 41761, 41810-11 (West Spec. Pamph. 1976) (formerly id. §§
17702, 17901-02 (West Supp. 1977).
8. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 41761 (West Spec. Pamph. 1976) (formerly id. § 17702 (West
Supp. 1977)).
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ciently wealthy such that its district aid, when added to its basic aid of $125
per pupil, exceeds the district's per-pupil foundation program amount, the
excess is treated as unused district aid.9 Equalization aid (E. Aid) consists of
funds allocated by the state to each district in which the sum of its basic aid
and district aid is insufficient to meet that district's foundation program
amount. 10 The state is able, by means of equalization aid, to guarantee each
district a specified foundation program amount per ADA on the assumption
that each district makes a tax effort equal to the specified computational tax
rate.
Using the foundation program formulas made applicable for the school
year 1973-74 by Senate Bill 9011 and Assembly Bill 1267,12 the foundation
program amount for unified school districts was approximately $843 per
ADA. 13 These formulas thus ensured that no unified district, no matter how
"poor" in per-pupil taxable wealth, would have less than $843 per pupil to
spend if its tax rate were at least $3.87 per $100 of modified assessed
valuation. Calfornia's foundation program makes use of the following
formula:
F.P. = Basic Aid + D. Aid + E. Aid
ADA ADA
Using the 1973-74 figures mentioned previously,
$843 = $125 + .0387 MAV + E. Aid
ADA ADA
Solving this equation for the equalization aid per pupil to which a unified
school district of given wealth (MAV/ADA) is entitled,
E. Aid = $718 - .0387 MAV
ADA ADA
9. See figure 1, page 457.
10. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 41761 (West Spec. Pamph. 1976) (formerly id. § 17702 (West
Supp. 1977)).
II. 1972 Cal. Stats., ch. 1406, at 2931.
12. 1973 Cal. Stats., ch. 208, at 528. Senate Bill 90 was the legislative response to Serrano
L Assembly Bill 1267 was enacted primarily to "clean up" technical errors present in Senate
Bill 90.
13. This figure is based on an average "mix" of elementary and high school students of
two elementary students for each high school pupil, where the foundation program amounts
were $765 per elementary pupil and $950 per high school pupil and the ADA exceeds 900
elementary and 300 high school students (CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 41704, 41712 [West Spec.
Pamph. 19761 [formerly id. §§ 17656, 17665 (West Supp. 1977)]), with a $20 per-pupil bonus for
the more highly-favored unified school districts (CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 41730-31 [West Spec.
Pamph. 1976] [formerly id. §§ 17671-17672 (West Supp. 1977)]). As a result of automatic
inflation adjustments and special increases, the foundation program amounts in 1976-77 were
$1012 per elementary pupil and $1198 per high school pupil, with a $20 per-pupil bonus for
unified districts. Assuming a "mix" of two elementary students for each high school pupil, this
creates a foundation program amount for unified districts of $1094 per ADA, compared to the
1973-74 figure of $843 per ADA.
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Figure 1 indicates how unified districts of differing wealth are affected
by this illustrative foundation program. The graph therein indicates several
things: First, each district, regardless of its wealth (MAV/ADA), is entitled
to basic aid in the amount of $125 per pupil. Second, the expected amount
of district aid is proportional to the wealth of the district. One can determine
from Figure 1 the district aid expected of a district of given wealth (e.g., a
MAV/ADA of $10,000) by selecting that MAV/ADA on the horizontal axis
and measuring the vertical distance at that location from the horizontal basic
aid line up to the sloping line (Line X). This vertical distance, at a taxable
wealth of $10,000 per ADA, numerically translates to $387 of district aid.
This amount, when added to $125 of basic aid, brings that district's expect-
ed revenues up to $512 per ADA. That figure is $331 per ADA short of the
$843 per ADA foundation program in 1973-74. Third, the figure shows that
equalization aid is inversely proportional to district wealth. To the extent
that a district's basic aid and computed district aid do not bring the district's
per-pupil revenues up to the foundation program of $843 per ADA, equali-
zation aid is apportioned, making up the difference. Thus, for a district of
$10,000 MAV/ADA wealth, equalization aid in the amount of $331 per
ADA will be allocated to bring the district's anticipated revenues up to the
foundation program amount. At a district MAV/ADA wealth of $10,000 per
ADA, $331 is graphically represented by the vertical distance from that
point in Line X to the horizontal line representing the foundation program of
$843 per ADA. Fourth, it will be seen that all equalization aid districts will
have $843 to spend for educating each pupil if they all have the same tax rate
of $3.87 per $100 of modified assessed valuation. No district need have less
than $843 to spend for each pupil if it will shoulder that minimum tax rate.
Fifth, Figure 1 shows that equalization aid becomes zero at that MAV/ADA
at which Line X intersects the horizontal foundation program line. This
point on the district wealth axis is sometimes known as the break point,
which signifies the dividing line between equalization aid districts and basic
aid districts. Of the state's 251 unified school districts in 1973-74, equaliza-
tion aid districts educated eighty-five percent of the pupils and basic aid
districts educated the remaining fifteen percent. Only five percent of all
unified school district pupils were taught in districts of wealth greater than
$30,000 MAV/ADA; almost half of these pupils were educated in the San
Francisco Unified School District, which had a wealth of $38,551 MAV/A-
DA.14 Sixth, Figure 1 also illustrates that the district aid computed for a
basic aid district, when added to its allocation of $125 per ADA, would
bring its revenues above the foundation program level of $843. This means
that any district aid in excess of $718 (foundation program of $843 minus
basic aid of $125) is unused.
14. CALIF. STATE DEP'T OF EDUC., 1973-74 CALIFORNIA PUBLIC SCHOOL SELECTED STA-
TISTICS 27-28, 112 (1975).
[Vol. 4
Summer 1977] CASE OF MISSED OPPORTUNITIES
Figure 1
Sources of Revenues of Unified Districts
of Different "Wealth" (MAV/ADA) Within Structure
of Foundation Program in 1973-74
Eq. Aid Basic Aid -
Districts Districts
(Educate 85% (Educate 15%
S1400 of pupils) of pupils)
$1200 &T,,Unused" D. Aid
$1000 I "
$00 E. AidZ ey"Used" D. Aid
S 400
*L-D. Aid
S 200. Base Basic -Basic Aid = $125/ADA.
0 7l-Aid I Aid
0 $10,000 $20,000 $30,000 S40,000 $50,000
District "Wealth" (MAV/ADA)
Thus, in the illustrated case of a basic aid district of $30,000 MAV/A-
DA with the same $3.87 tax rate, its revenue would be comprised of basic
aid of $125 per ADA, utilized district aid of $718 per ADA, and unutilized
district aid of $443 per ADA, for a total of $1286 per ADA. This district
could achieve its foundation program level of $843 per ADA by using a tax
rate of $2.39 per $100 of MAV (718 - $30,000/100), which is $1.48 less
than the computational rate of $3.87 required of all equalization aid districts
to achieve their foundation programs.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the essence of the foundation
program concept is that the state guarantees each district a certain number of
dollars per pupil to spend, using a local tax rate that is not excessive, and
which is the same for all similar equalization aid districts. This way of
viewing the foundation program concept, that is, from the perspective of
limiting the tax rate required by any district to achieve a specified spending
level, regardless of its wealth, is illustrated by Figure 2.
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(Basic Aid Districts)
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The curved line shows what the tax rate of a district would be were it
compelled to raise the entire $718 per pupil required without any state
assistance in the form of equalization aid. The curve is generated by
application of'the following formula:
Revenues = Tax Rate x MAV
ADA ADA
Thus,
Tax Rate = $718 + MAV
ADA
The horizontal line, at a tax rate of $3.87 per $100 of modified assessed
valuation, demonstrates that the foundation program is a means of preclud-
ing excessive tax rates in low-wealth districts in order to achieve a certain
spending level for each pupil. Since eighty-five percent of all pupils are
educated in equalization aid districts that need not exceed the specified
computational tax rate to achieve their respective foundation program
spending levels, it is clear that no district need have fewer dollars to spend
than its specified foundation program amount.
It is true, as noted in Serrano Ht,1 5 that basic aid districts can achieve
their foundation program amounts with tax rates lower than their computa-
tional rates, as illustrated in Figure 2. But it is also true that each district can
achieve the foundation program level without imposing an excessive local
tax rate, and in that sense the foundation program is equally available to
every district. Dollars in the foundation program are made available to the
district in order that it may provide educational opportunities for its pupils;
15. 18 Cal. 3d at 744, 746, 757, 557 P.2d at 937-38, 945, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 353-54, 361.
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to the extent that the foundation programs are equal, foundation program
dollars will provide equal educational opportunities.
16
B. Categorical Aid
The foundation program funds in California are designed to assure a
basic educational program for children with typical educational needs. The
designers of the California system have long recognized, however, that it
costs more to educate certain types of students, such as the physically,
mentally, or culturally handicapped, and that it costs more to provide certain
types of services, such as pupil transportation in sparsely-settled com-
munities. Acknowledging that these higher-cost burdens are not equally
distributed among the districts, the state and federal governments have
provided categorical aids to help shoulder the costs inherent in assuming the
atypical burdens of operating such specialized programs.
In some states, these atypical burdens are taken into account by utiliz-
ing a "weighted-pupil" approach. For example, according a typical
elementary pupil a weight of one, the educational authorities might give a
high school pupil a weight of 1.2, and an educable mentally retarded pupil a
weight of two. In other states a "staffing ratio" might be utilized in which a
standard ratio of students to certificated staff personnel is determined for
each of the various types of designated institutions, including, inter alia,
elementary, handicapped, vocational, and high schools. By this method,
educational authorities would first determine the number of staff members
16. There are three exceptions to the general rule that the per-pupil foundation program
amounts are equal for districts of the same type. First, the designers of California's foundation
program system, recognizing that a low population density and other factors sometimes make it
necessary to maintain inefficient schools, have adjusted foundation program guarantees to
account for the diseconomies of scale involved in operating such schools. Thus, for a "neces-
sary small school," CAL. EDUC. CODE § 41702 (West Spec. Pamph. 1976) (formerly id. § 17655
(West Supp. 1977)), with an ADA of less than 26 and employing at least one full-time teacher,
the basic foundation program amount in 1973-74 was $18,875. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 41703(a)(1)
(West Spec. Pamph. 1976) (formerly id. § 17655.5(a)(1) (West Supp. 1977)). If a school has an
ADA of 25, this would result in a guaranteed $755 per pupil; but if the ADA is only five, there
would be a foundation program guarantee of $3775 per pupil. Second, to discourage mainte-
nance of unnecessary small schools, the foundation programs for such institutions are reduced
in all but the smaller districts from the basic amount by $10 per pupil. CAL. EDUC. CODE §
41703(b), 41704, 41771(b)(1) (West Spec. Pamph. 1976) (formerly id. §§ 17655.5(b), 17656, 17709
(b)(1) (West Supp. 1977)). Third, to encourage efficient school district organization, the founda-
tion programs for unified school districts are increased by $20 per pupil. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§
41730,41731,41735 (West Spec. Pamph. 1976) (formerly id. §§ 17671, 17672, 17676 (West Supp.
1977)). Thus, despite the fact that the per-pupil foundation program guarantees are not equal for
all districts of the same type, they may be treated as though they were equal for purposes of
constitutional review because per-pupil disparities exceeding $20 are the result of attempts to
adjust for diseconomies of scale, and disparities of only $20 are caused by attempts to
encourage more efficient school district organization.
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needed and then proceed to fix the level of support to be guaranteed by the
state.
In California, however, the lawmakers have chosen to meet special
needs through grants of categorical aids funds. Virtually all categorical aids
are distributed to school districts without regard to their per-pupil taxable
wealth. 17 The most notable exception is federal "Public Law 81-874
money," or funds provided for educational agencies in areas affected by
federal activity. 18 A substantial part of those funds goes to districts losing
taxable wealth because of large tax-exempt federal facilities located therein,
such as the Wheatland and Travis Air Force bases. The plaintiffs in Serrano
H essentially agreed that categorical aids are not sources of unequal spend-
ing in relation to districts' educational task loads; thus, they did not allege
that this component of the school financing system led to unequal education-
al opportunities. The trial court acknowledged as much by specifically
excepting "categorical aids special needs programs" from the features of
the school financing system found to be unconstitutional. 19
C. Local Supplements
Before discussing local supplements, it should be observed that if the
foundation and categorical aids programs were the only sources of school
district revenues, the system would essentially provide equal educational
opportunities to the extent that financial resources are a measure of the
quality of education offered by a district. Each district would be entitled to
its foundation program funds, which provide essentially equal educational
opportunities, and to categorical aids, which adjust the system to provide for
atypical needs as perceived by the federal and state lawmakers.
In addition to foundation program funds and categorical aids, each
school district is empowered to adopt a budget that provides for supple-
mental revenues obtained by local property taxation. In this regard, Califor-
nia's Constitution directs the county governing body having jurisdiction
over each district to levy annual school district taxes sufficient to bring each
district's revenue up to its budgeted amount, 20 subject to such maximum tax
17. Some categorical aids, however, do draw distinctions based on family wealth or
poverty, by providing additional funds for districts in which there is a high incidence of family
poverty. See, e.g., Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-10,79 Stat. 27
(1965); Elementary and Secondary Education Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-247, Title
VII, 81 Stat. 783, 816 (1968); California's Educationally Disadvantaged Youth Programs, CAL.
EDUC. CODE §§ 54000-07 (West Spec. Pamph. 1976) (formerly id §§ 6499.230-.238 (West Supp.
1977)).
18. See Act of Sept. 30, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-874, 64 Stat. 1100 (codified at 20 U.S.C.A.
§§ 237 to 241-1 (West Supp. 1977)).
19. Serrano H, 18 Cal. 3d at 749 n.21, 557 P.2d at 940 n.21, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 356 n.21.
20. CAL. CONST. art. XiII, § 21.
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rates as the legislature may provide.2 In addition, the legislature has
authorized the voters of each district to vote "overrides" of the maximum
tax rates established by law.22 Revenues in excess of foundation program
funds and categorical aids will be referred to as "local supplements"; the
power to provide such local supplements will be denominated "local fiscal
control."
Since unequal education, as measured by per-pupil spending levels
adjusted for atypical educational task loads, results solely from unequal/
local supplements, Serrano I was primarily concerned with those funds. A
school financing system that allows a substantial degree of local fiscal
control inevitably results in substantial differences in educational offerings
unless all community characteristics that materially affect the ability and
willingness of local taxpayers to provide tax monies for local supplements
are substantially equalized.
The power to provide local supplements in a given district depends
upon the interaction of several community characteristics associated with





Foundation Program plus Categorical Aids
Low 4 "District Wealth"-MAV/ADA • High
21. Id. at § 20.
22. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 42202 (West Spec. Pamph. 1976). Prior to enactment of S.B. 90,
maximum tax rates were established in terms of specified dollar-amount rates per $100 of
assessed valuation. Law of July 18, 1968, ch. 664, § 1, 1968 Cal. Stats. 1343-45 (repealed 1974).
Senate Bill 90 changed this, so that a district's maximum tax rate is derived by a complicated
formula from a per-pupil "revenue limit" calculated for that particular district. CAL. EDUC.
CODE § 42238 (West Spec. Pamph. 1976) (formerly iad. § 20905 (West Supp. 1977)). Under the
new system, the electorate has the power to vote to increase each district's per-pupil revenue
limit, CAL. EDUC. CODE § 42202 (West Spec. Pamph. 1976) (formerly id. § 20803.2 (West Supp.
1977)).
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Foundation Program plus Categorical Aids
Low *- Other Local Gov't Prop. Taxes - . High
Each of these figures shows the expected per-pupil local supplements
in districts in which all community characteristics affecting the ability and
willingness of the taxpayers to provide local supplements are precisely the
same, with the exception of the designated community characteristic. Thus
Figure 3 shows how per-pupil local supplements can be expected to vary
among districts of different wealth (MA V/ADA) where relevant community
characteristics of the districts are otherwise the same. Under these circum-
stances, the taxpayers of each district would be willing and able to sustain
essentially the same school tax rate above the computational rate, but for the
law of diminishing returns. Since the per-pupil yield of a given tax rate is
directly proportional to per-pupil assessed valuation, the local supplements
increase in direct proportion to district wealth. In the case of basic aid
districts, however, there is a sharper rise in local supplements because of the
unused district aid,23 assuming the same total school tax rate for all of the
districts. This increase, which would be depicted by a straight line if all
school tax rates were equal, becomes less steep in the case of wealthier basic
aid districts because of the law of diminishing returns. Thus, even though all
other relevant community characteristics are considered to be the same,
23. See Figure 1, page 457.
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taxpayers in an extremely wealthy district would not be willing to sustain the
same tax rate as that imposed by other districts in the belief that they would
not be getting a full dollar's worth of educational benefits for each additional
tax dollar.
Figure 4 shows how local supplements can be expected to vary among
districts in which all relevant community characteristics, including district
wealth, are the same except for the average wealth or income of the district's
families. Since wealthier families can afford to pay higher property taxes,
the local supplements derived from such taxes are expected to increase with
the wealth of the families. Again, the law of diminishing returns dictates a
lesser rate of increase in local supplements congruent with the increase in
family wealth in the community.
Figure 5 illustrates how local supplements may be expected to vary
among districts that are identical in all relevant aspects except for their
"municipal overburden"-the property tax rates required to support all
local governmental services other than the public schools in question. These
include property tax rates for counties and cities, which vary from a low of
about two dollars per hundred dollars of assessed valuation to a high of
almost nine dollars, and special districts such as fire protection, flood
control, lighting and sewer maintenance, sanitation, and water, and even
community college districts, which were excluded from consideration in the
Serrano trial proceedings. Since school districts compete with these other
government agencies for the local property tax dollar, those school districts
situated in communities with high "municipal overburden" are less able to
provide local supplements, as indicated by Figure 5.
Other isolated community characteristics also determine the production
of local supplements. These include the relative costs of providing the same
quality of educational services; the ratio of children attending public schools
to total population; the ratio of assessed valuations to fair market values; and
various indicators of the educational aspirations of the citizens in the
community, such as the incidence of professional persons, the number of
parents who are college graduates, and so forth. Each district will have its
own unique cluster of community characteristics that determine the extent to
which that district can and will exact tax revenue to enrich the school
program; no single community characteristic is controlling with respect to
the power of a district to raise disequalizing local supplements.
As previously noted, any system that allows a substantial degree of
local fiscal control will inevitably result in unequal education on a statewide
basis, to the extent that local money makes a difference in the quality of
educational opportunities offered. This unequal education can find no ra-
tional justification in any selected community characteristic, or even in any
Summer 1977]
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cluster of community characteristics, because none of them have any rele-
vance to the quality of education to which a child is constitutionally entitled
subsequent to the denomination of education as a fundamental right in
Serrano 1.24 The only rational justification for unequal schooling, when
challenged on equal protection grounds, must be found in the concept of
local fiscal control. 25
Without such local control, fiscal planners in the state capitol would be
required to make all decisions concerning how much money each district
would have to spend each school year. Neither the plaintiffs, the defendants,
the trial court, nor the California Supreme Court26 deemed that requirement
to be a desirable or a required solution. The problem that the state supreme
court had to confront was how to balance the goal of local fiscal control with
the goal of equal educational opportunity for all California school children.
II. The Constitutional Test of Serrano H
A. Background: Origins of District Power Equalizing
In an influential book published in 1970,27 John Coons, William
Clune, and Stephen Sugarman examined the foundation program model for
school financing and concluded that this model causes a district's per-pupil
revenue to depend upon that district's per-pupil taxable wealth. They elo-
quently argued that this interdependence was improper; accordingly they
asserted, "[tihe quality of public education may not be a function of wealth
other than the wealth of the state as a whole." 28 Coons, Clune, and
Sugarman treated public education as a matter of statewide concern. They
acknowledged nevertheless that local fiscal control is a legitimate value to
be preserved in a state school financing system; by use of the term "subsid-
iarity," they acknowledged the general principle that governmental deci-
sions should be made at the lowest level of the state bureaucracy at which
24. Serrano I, 5 Cal. 3d at 608-09, 487 P.2d at 1258-59, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618-19.
25. The trial court found that: "[i]ocal fiscal control, valued by all school officials,
assumes the existence of a relationship between cost and quality [of educational programs]."
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 40, Serrano v. Priest, No. 938,254, Super. Ct. of
the County of Los Angeles (Aug. 30, 1974).
26. In the words of the court in Serrano II, "The constitutional provision [CAL. CONST.
art. XIII, § 21 (formerly art. IX, § 6, para. 6)], as we shall point out more fully below,
'mandated' only that there be a system allowing for local decision as to the level of school
expenditures and that the mechanism to be utilized in providing revenues to permit such
expenditures be a county levy of school district taxes." 18 Cal. 3d at 771, 557 P.2d at 955, 135
Cal. Rptr. at 371. Serrano I also recognized the importance of the "local fiscal control"
provision in the state constitution. See Serrano I, 5 Cal. 3d at 592-96, 487 P.2d at 1246-49, 96
Cal. Rptr. at 606-09.
27. J. COONS, W. CLUNE, & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION
(1970) [hereinafter cited as COONS, CLUNE, & SUGARMAN].
28. Id. at 2.
[Vol. 4
such decisions can efficiently be made, that is, at that level closest to the
people affected. z9 The authors accordingly did not propose to eliminate local
fiscal control, but rather proposed simply to equalize the power of districts
to raise local supplements. To effect this proposal, Coons, Clune, and
Sugarman advocated a system of "district power equalizing" (DPE), which
would treat all districts as though they had the same per-pupil assessed
valuation for the purpose of determining the number of dollars per pupil
available to spend.
The essential ingredient of DPE is that all districts having the same
school tax rate would be entitled to receive the same per-pupil revenues,
excluding categorical aids. This was to be accomplished by a system of
state-imposed rewards for the tax efforts of low-wealth districts and penal-
ties for the tax efforts of high-wealth districts.
30
Since unequal district tax efforts necessarily produce unequal net reve-
nue, the DPE system does not purport to result in equal educational opportu-
nities; its purpose is simply to neutralize the influence of district wealth on
district spending levels. Because of the inherent limits of DPE-in particu-
lar, its indifference to all other community characteristics that influence
district per-pupil revenues-the mere establishment of such a system might
well have little or no calculable effect in terms of equalizing per-pupil
revenue or expenditures. In other words, DPE provides no assurance what-
soever that the cause of equal education will be advanced.
How is it that Coons, Clune, and Sugarman selected the single commu-
nity characteristic of district wealth as the villain in the school finance
drama? One reason, of course, is that high district wealth is a community
characteristic that, taken alone, is indicative of ability to provide local
supplements. Another reason is that the authors observed that the United
States Supreme Court had established two distinct standards of judicial
review-one, the "rational basis" test, which almost any legislation could
pass; the other, the "strict scrutiny" test, which most legislation could not
pass.31 Strict scrutiny would be triggered if a court characterized the ad-
versely-affected interest as "fundamental" or if a court characterized the
legislative classification as "suspect." Deeming a child's interest in educa-
tion to be "fundamental," Coons, Clune, and Sugarman also concluded
that, by analogy to certain decisions by the United States Supreme Court
involving wealth-based discriminations against individuals,32 classifications
29. Id. at 14-20.
30. Id. at 163-68.
31. See text accompanying notes 47-52 and 92-98 infra.
32. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (invalidating poll tax as a de
facto discrimination against the poor); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (free counsel
must be provided to an indigent criminal defendant where he has only one appeal as of right);
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based on district wealth should be treated as suspect. 33
The "reward-for-effort" (or upward-power-equalizing) component of
DPE was not a new idea. It was first proposed by Harland Updegraff in
1922. 34 Dr. Erick L. Lindman, called by the defendants as an expert witness
on the subject of school finance in the Serrano trial, testified that in the
early 1940's he developed such a reward-for-effort system with respect to
school building aid for the state of Washington. He pointed out, however,
that such a system has two important drawbacks: its stimulation of unequal
incentives for a local tax effort creates new sets of advantaged and disadvan-
taged districts, and its failure to place a ceiling on the local tax effort that
would be rewarded generates an unpredictable annual withdrawal from the
state treasury that hampers responsible state fiscal planning. In Washing-
ton, the state thus found it necessary to approve the cost of the proposed
school facility before it made its equalizing grants for school construction
costs. Yet, as Dr. Lindman pointed out, if the state places a ceiling on the
local tax effort to be rewarded, the result is essentially a foundation program
system under another name. 35 These drawbacks to the open-ended, reward-
for-effort system probably explain the failure of such a system to gain any
foothold in the school financing systems of the fifty states.
36
Although the reward-for-effort component of the Coons, Clune, and
Sugarman DPE proposal was not new to school fiscal designers, the penalty-
for-effort component was novel. Such novelty arises from this component's
inherent inutility; fiscal designers would be likely to find that this compo-
nent only exacerbates the unequal incentive effects already discovered in the
reward-for-effort system. Planners are more interested in searching for
acceptable ways to increase the ability of poorer districts to obtain needed
funds than ways to decrease the similar ability of a few wealthier districts to
some common denominator.
37
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (free transcripts must be provided to indigents in criminal
appeals).
33. COONS, CLUNE, & SUGARMAN, supra note 27, at 374.
34. See K. ALEXANDER & K. JONES, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM OF SCHOOL FINANCE 33,41
(1973).
35. Record at 4055-68, Serrano II, 18 Cal. 3d 728,557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976).
36. For example, even though New Jersey lawmakers acted under compulsion of a
judicial decree requiring equalization of educational opportunities, they chose to place a limit
upon annual budget increases in establishing a reward-for-effort system, although the state
Commissioner was empowered to approve requests for larger increases. Thus, the lawmakers
declined to issue blank checks to the districts to be rewarded for their tax efforts; the New
Jersey Supreme Court upheld the validity of the legislation, assuming that the equalizing
program would be fully funded by the state. Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 449, 355 A.2d 129
(1976).
37. The philosophy that invokes the penalty-for-effort component of DPE would seem
to require any district to reject an exceptionally qualified applicant for a teaching position
because children in other classes would thereby be denied equal educational opportunities.
[Vol. 4
B. The Holding in Serrano I
With this background, it is time to consider the Serrano litigation
itself, which originated with a complaint filed in late August, 1968. The
plaintiffs' allegations bore a remarkable resemblance to the arguments set
forth in Private Wealth and Public Education .38 The complaint alleged that
California's system of school financing made the quality of education "a
function of the wealth of the children's parents and neighbors, as measured
by the tax base of the school district in which said children reside. .. .
Claiming that education is a fundamental interest and that wealth is a suspect
classification, the plaintiffs then alleged that California's foundation pro-
gram system denied equal protection because it made the quality of a child's
education depend upon the wealth of the school district in which that child
resided. Both plaintiffs' challenge and Coons, Clune, and Sugarman's thesis
are grounded on the assertion that the quality of education may not be a
function of district wealth.
The complaint failed to survive in the trial court, which sustained the
defendants' general demurrers and entered a judgment of dismissal after the
plaintiffs' failure to amend.40 On appeal, however, the California Supreme
Court held that the complaint did indeed state a cause of action.41 In the
course of its Serrano I decision, the court determined that district wealth is a
suspect classification, 42 that education is a fundamental interest,43 that these
determinations triggered the strict scrutiny test,44 and that the system as
described in the complaint could not pass muster under the strict scrutiny
test. 45 The equal protection analysis utilized in Serrano I is worth focusing
on both because it established the ultimate criterion for constitutionality
developed by the court in Serrano HI, namely, that district spending cannot
be a function of district wealth, and because the reasoning by which the
criterion was established Was inherently fallacious.
The faulty analysis is contained in the second of the following para-
graphs of the Serrano I opinion:
Finally, defendants suggest that the wealth of a school district does
not necessarily reflect the wealth of the families who live there.
The simple answer to this argument is that plaintiffs have alleged
that there is a correlation between a district's per pupil assessed
valuation and the wealth of its residents and we treat these material
facts as admitted by the demurrers.
38. COONS, CLUNE, & SUGARMAN, supra note 27.
39. Serrano I, 5 Cal. 3d at 590 n.1, 487 P.2d at 1244 n.1, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 604 n.1.
40. Id. at 591, 487 P.2d at 1245, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 605.
41. Id. at 617-18, 487 P.2d at 1264-66, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 624-26.
42. Id. at 597-604, 487 P.2d at 1250-55, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 610-15.
43. Id. at 604-10, 487 P.2d at 1255-59, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 615-19.
44. Id. at 596-97, 487 P.2d at 1249-50, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 609-10.
45. Id. at 610-17, 487 P.2d at 1259-65, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 619-25.
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More basically, however, we reject defendants' underlying
thesis that classification by wealth is constitutional so long as the
wealth is that of the district, not the individual. We think that
discrimination on the basis of district wealth is equally invalid. The
commercial and industrial property which augments a district's tax
base is distributed unevenly throughout the state. To allot more
educational dollars to the children of one district than to those of
another merely because of the fortuitous presence of such property
is to make the quality of a child's education dependent upon the
location of private commercial and industrial establishments. Sure-
ly, this is to rely on the most irrelevant of factors as the basis for
educational financing.46
There are three fallacies in the second paragraph above. First, the
paragraph poses the wrong question. Traditionally, of course, the threshold
problem in equal protection cases is whether the particular state action
triggers the rational basis or the strict scrutiny standard of judicial review.
47
Once that standard has been determined, the state, in cases applying strict
scrutiny, must bring forth a compelling interest to justify its mode of
classification. 48 The paragraphs quoted appear in a section of the opinion
entitled "Wealth as a Suspect Classification"; this topic is relevant only to
the selection of which equal protection standard ought to be applied. But in
Serrano I, the court never properly found a suspect classification. After
three pages of discussion in which the court found the school financing
system to be based on wealth, 49 it continued with the two paragraphs quoted
above. The court there attempted to bridge the gap between personal wealth,
a suspect classification, and district wealth, but did not state why the latter
was similarly suspect. This error occurred because of the court's misunder-
standing of the defendants' "underlying thesis," that is, the question of
whether district wealth is in fact a suspect classification. Defendants'
underlying thesis was that classification by wealth is not suspect so long as
the wealth is that of the district, not that of the individual. The court,
however, struck down a "straw man" by assuming that the defendants'
underlying thesis was "that classification by wealth is constitutional so long
as the wealth is that of the district, not the individual." ' 5 The court thus
prematurely inquired into the ultimate question of whether or not a classifi-
cation based on district wealth, as distinguished from personal wealth, is
constitutional, when it should have determined the preliminary issue of
whether such a classification is suspect. Had the California Supreme Court
46. Id. at 600-01, 487 P.2d at 1252-53, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 612-13.
47. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 142 (1972).
48. See Westbrook v. Mihaly, 2 Cal. 3d 765, 784-85, 471 P.2d 487, 500-01, 87 Cal. Rptr.
839, 852-53 (1970), cited in Serrano I, 5 Cal. 3d at 597, 487 P.2d at 1249-50, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 609-
10.
49. Serrano I, 5 Cal. 3d at 597-600, 487 P.2d at 1250-52, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 610-12.
50. Id. at 601, 487 P.2d at 1252, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 612 (emphasis added).
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adopted a logical methodology for analyzing equal protection claims, it
might have arrived at a conclusion on the issue of district wealth as a suspect
classification similar to that of Justice Powell in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez." Justice Powell found that strict scrutiny was
unwarranted; he concluded that the Texas school financing scheme passed
the rational basis test.52
Second, the analysis used in answering the wrong question, whether
district wealth is a constitutional basis for educational financing, was also
faulty. The court thought the defendants were arguing that the distribution of
commercial and industrial property among districts is somehow relevant to
the quality of a child's education.53 But the defendants' actual argument was
that the values inherent in permitting local fiscal control are relevant to the
quality of education children will receive throughout the state. As already
noted, no community characteristic can be offered as a legitimate basis for
allocating educational dollars. Only the values inherent in permitting local
fiscal decision-making can legitimately be advanced as a justification for a
differential allocation. These are the very same values on which the Serrano
plaintiffs relied to support their "district power equalizing" alternative.
54
They are also the same values protected by article thirteen of the California
Constitution. 5 Thus, because the state supreme court misconstrued the
contentions of the defendants, the wrong question was answered by the use
of fallacious reasoning.
Third, the Serrano I equal protection analysis proves to be untenable.
56
The major premise of this analysis is that a community characteristic that
allots more educational dollars to the children of one district than it does to
those of another is an invalid, unconstitutional classification if that commu-
nity characteristic is irrelevant to the quality of a child's education. The
court reasoned that the fortuitous presence of commercial and industrial
51. 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973).
52. Id. at 18-29.
53. The location of commercial and industrial property in a school district is obviously a
prime factor differentiating district wealth from the personal wealth of a child's parents and
neighbors. It will be recalled that the complaint ambiguously alleged that the financing scheme
made "the quality of education for school age children . . . a function of the wealth of the
childrens' parents and neighbors, as measured by the tax base of the school district in which
said children reside .. "Serrano 1, 5 Cal. 3d at 590 n. 1,487 P.2d at 1244 n. 1, 96 Cal. Rptr. at
604 n.1 (emphasis added).
54. Plaintiffs claimed to be "the real champions of local fiscal control." Brief for Re-
spondents at 217, Serrano II, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976).
55. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, §§ 20, 21.
56. For an example of a legitimate resolution of the problem, see San Antonio Indepen-
dent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), in which the United States Supreme Court
set forth sound reasons for its determination that district wealth should not be treated as a
suspect classification for the purpose of triggering the "strict scrutiny" standard of judicial
review.
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property within a school district will result in differential allocations of
educational dollars, that this fortuity is surely irrelevant to the quality of a
child's education, and that therefore classification by district wealth is
unconstitutional. But any financing system, including DPE, that permits a
substantial measure of local fiscal control will inevitably result in an unequal
allotment of educational dollars on the basis of many community character-
istics, each of which is irrelevant to the quality of education a child has the
right to expect. If the court's major premise is true, all community charac-
teristics that affect the allocation of educational dollars are rendered
unconstitutional to the extent that they are utilized as bases for classifica-
tion. To adopt such a draconian position is tantamount to requiring that the
school financing system produce substantially equal per pupil revenues in
order to comport with the mandate of the California Constitution.
57
C. The Holding in Serrano H
Following remand by the supreme court, a trial on the merits com-
menced on December 26, 1972, the same day that Senate Bill 90,58 the
legislature's response to Serrano I, became effective. S.B. 90 greatly
increased state support of the public schools by expanding both the founda-
tion programs and the categorical aids. It also established a new method of
fixing a district's maximum tax rate, using a new per-pupil "revenue limit"
concept. It was this new financing system that went on trial.
In the course of that trial, the plaintiffs made no attempt to prove that
there was a correlation between a district's per-pupil assessed valuation and
the wealth of its residents, despite the understanding of the court in Serrano
I that the plaintiffs would do so.5 9 In short, plaintiffs failed to show that
poor people tend to live in poor school districts. 6° With respect to the wealth
discrimination issue, 61 plaintiffs, relying on Serrano rs characterization of
district wealth as the villain, simply offered data showing both wide dis-
57. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 21.
58. 1972 Cal. Stats., ch. 1406, at 2931.
59. See Serrano I, 5 Cal. 3d at 600-01, 487 P.2d at 1252-53, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 612-13.
60. Evidence offered by the defendants indicated a lack of any significant correlation
between the Index of Family Poverty and district expenditures per pupil. CALIF. STATE DEP'T
OF EDUC., CALIFORNIA STATE TESTING PROGRAM, 1969-70, 571, 574, 577 (1972). A 1974 study,
too late for use in the trial proceedings, concluded that "[t]here appears to be no significant
relationship between the AV/ADA of school districts and the presence in them of children 6-17
years old from families earning less than poverty level." SENATE OFFICE OF RESEARCH, THE
INCIDENCE IN SCHOOL DISTRICTS OF CHILDREN 6-17 YEARS OLD FROM FAMILIES EARNING LESS
THAN POVERTY LEVEL BY ASSESSED VALUATION PER CHILD OF THE SCHOOL DISTRICT 10 (Calif.
1974).
61. The only other issue of fact was whether district spending levels significantly affect
quality of education; the trial court resolved this issue in favor of the plaintiffs. Serrano II, 18
Cal. 3d at 748-50 & nn.19-21,557 P.2d at 939-40 & nn.19-21, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 355-56 & nn.19-21.
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parities in district wealth and the expected influence of such disparities on
district spending levels under the new financing system.
62
On March 21, 1973, while the trial was in progress, the United States
Supreme Court handed down its decision in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez.63 The Court held that the foundation program
system of financing public schools in Texas did not violate the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution. The majority opinion by Justice Powell specifically rejected the
notion that district wealth, as opposed to individual wealth, should be
considered suspect for purposes of equal protection analysis. 64 Neverthe-
less, the trial court, adhering to Serrano I's determination that district
wealth is suspect, held that S.B. 90 violated the California Constitution's
equal protection provisions because impermissible wealth-related disparities
in per-pupil expenditures and tax rates would continue under the new
financing program for an unreasonable period of time. 65 In Serrano H, the
state supreme court affirmed the trial court judgment without modifica-
tion.
66
What then is the meaning of the trial court decision, affirmed by
Serrano H? It means that local supplements cannot materially depend on
district wealth (MAV/ADA), but it indicates in addition that local supple-
ments must be a function of the tax rates chosen by the districts. In a system
in which property taxes are the only source of per-pupil local supplements,
such supplements will be determined by application of equation (1):
Local Supps. = Tax Rate x AV
ADA ADA
where "Tax Rate" is that rate chosen in the district to provide for local
supplements and "AV/ADA" is the total assessed valuation of taxable
property in the district divided by the district's average daily attendance. But
since Serrano H specifies that a district's per-pupil local supplements may
not materially depend on its per-pupil taxable wealth, the last term of
equation (1) must be effectively neutralized and replaced with a constant
(K), which yields equation (2):
62. See id. at 745 n.17, 747 n.18, 557 P.2d at 937 n. 17, 938 n. 18, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 353 n. 17,
354 n.18.
63. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
64. Id. at 33-34.
65. The essence of the trial court judgment is set forth in Serrano II, 18 Cal. 3d at 749 n.21,
557 P.2d at 940 n.21, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 356 n.21.
66. 18 Cal. 3d at 775-77, 557 P.2d at 957-58, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 373-74. In so doing, the
California Supreme Court failed to reconsider the fallacious reasoning process by which
Serrano I concluded that district wealth is "suspect," despite the intervening decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Rodriguez; it appeared instead to rely on the doctrine of the
law of the case. Serrano II, 18 Cal. 3d at 756, 765-66, 776, 557 P.2d at 944,951-52,958, 135 Cal.
Rptr. at 360, 367-68, 374.
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Local Supps. = Tax Rate x K.
ADA
Serrano 11's requirement that equation (2) be substituted for equation
(1) necessitates either an actual or an artificial equalization of the wealth of
all similar districts, or elimination of local property taxes as a source of local
supplements. Actual equalization of such wealth (MAV/ADA) can theoret-
ically be accomplished by gerrymandering district boundary lines so that all
districts of the same type (elementary, high school, or unified) would have
the same MAV/ADA, or so that there would be only a single, state-wide
school district of any type. The former reorganization could be facilitated by
transferring all commercial and industrial property from the local tax rolls to
a state property tax roll, since these types of property account for most of the
disparities in per-pupil taxable wealth among the districts. The artificial
method of equalizing district wealth has previously been described-it is the
district power equalizing (DPE) system. 67 Under DPE, the state would treat
each district of the same type as though it were a district of given wealth
when it establishes a tax rate for local supplements. The state would do this
by rewarding the tax effort of districts below the specified wealth and by
penalizing the tax effort of districts above the specified wealth. The net
result would be that, for a given tax rate, all districts of the same type would
be entitled to the same number of supplementary dollars per-pupil as would
be generated by that tax rate in a district of specified wealth (MAV/ADA).
Considered mathematically in connection with equation (2), the DPE system
establishes a value for the constant "K" of a specified MAV/ADA. The
formula for a DPE system could accordingly be written as follows in
equation (3):
Local Supps. = Tax Rate x (Specified MAV)
ADA ADA
Since under a DPE system the lawmakers would establish the value of the
term "Specified MAV/ADA," the mandate of Serrano 1 would be satis-
fied by a DPE system that artificially equalizes the wealth of all districts
of the same type at a specified wealth level.
68
The only other feasible way to satisfy equation (2) is by the elimination
of local property taxes as a source of local supplements. 69 Expressing this
method mathematically within the framework of equation (2), one would
merely set the value of the term "Tax Rate" at zero. This would express the
concept that school districts are not permitted to use local property taxes as a
source of local supplements. Two of the potential alternative systems of
67. See text accompanying notes 27-37 supra.
68. Accord, Serrano II, 18 Cal. 3d at 747, 557 P.2d at 939, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 355.
69. This does not mean that a state-wide property tax would be in violation of Serrano II.
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school financing found by the trial court to be feasible would utilize this
method of satisfying equation (2):70 full state funding, with the imposition
of a statewide property tax, and vouchers. 71 Full state funding, by defini-
tion, negates the possibility of any local supplementation. As for the other
alternative, there is nothing inherent in the structure of a voucher plan that
would enable it to satisfy equation (2) if local supplementation from local
property taxes is permitted. Accordingly, the voucher plan must be con-
sidered an alternative which does not permit such local supplementation
unless the wealth of the districts is actually or artificially equalized, as
previously described.
The ultimate meaning of Serrano H is that it requires a redistribution of
inequalities in educational offerings and a reshuffling of advantaged and
disadvantaged districts in accordance with those community characteristics,
other than district wealth, that favor or disfavor the raising of local
supplements. In light of the discussion above, there are several meanings
that cannot be imputed to the Serrano H decision. First, it does not mean
that local property taxation for schools is unconstitutional.72 Second, it does
not mean that equal expenditure levels, or equal educational opportunities,
are constitutionally required. Third, it does not mean that adequate expendi-
ture levels are necessitated by law.73 Fourth, it does not signal a victory for
poor children, since poor children are just as likely to be found in the newly-
disadvantaged wealthy districts as in the newly-advantaged poor districts.
IM. The First Opportunity Missed
Establishing criteria by which to test a school financing system's
validity under California's equal protection provisions was one of the vital
problems presented by the Serrano case. Development of such criteria
requires an examination of the various interests at stake in the search for
equal educational opportunities. In this regard, it is important to recall that
although equal education is an ideal that should be zealously pursued, it
can never be fully attained. Not all teachers in the same school district, or
even in the same school building, are equally effective. The same teacher
70. All of the potential alternative systems described by the trial court are set forth in
Serrano II, 18 Cal. 3d at 747, 557 P.2d at 938-39, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 354-55.
71. Id.
72. In fact, Serrano II recognized that the authority to raise local supplements (local fiscal
control) is found in article thirteen, section twenty-one of the California Constitution. Id. at
770, 557 P.2d at 954, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 370.
73. The trial court's memorandum opinion recognized this in stating "If such uniformity
of treatment were to result in all children being provided a low-quality educational program, or
even a clearly inadequate educational program, the California Constitution would be satisfied."
Serrano II, 18 Cal. 3d at 754 n.28, 557 P.2d at 943 n.28, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 359 n.28 (emphasis in
original).
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may be more effective with one student than with another. Moreover, it is
readily apparent that even uniform methods of selection and compensation
of teachers do not necessarily provide a satisfactory guarantee of equal
educational opportunities.
It is understandable then that efforts to provide equal education are
concentrated on the more manageable goal of equalizing resources available
to the public schools. Two ways to achieve this goal are (1) imposition of
state-established minimum educational standards, and (2) utilization of
fixed formulas for allotting educational dollars to school districts. Both
approaches are part of the majority of existing financing systems.
The first approach is illustrated by state requirements for the licensing
of teachers. This involves the promulgation of distinctly minimum stand-
ards; teachers with superior training and ability are permitted to teach even
though their presence in the classroom creates unequal opportunities.
Foundation programs such as California's 74 are an example of the
second, "formula" approach. In the allotment of educational dollars under
the foundation program, a similar philosophy of state-established guidelines
prevails: the state assures a basic amount of income per pupil to every
school district within its boundaries, the state and federal governments give
additional amounts in the form of categorical aid to eligible districts, and the
state permits local districts to supplement these amounts from local tax
sources. The state generally allows local electorates to raise additional
supplements by means of taxes that exceed maximum tax rates; thus, the
ability of a community to meet locally-perceived needs is not stifled.
Three effects of the foundation program system, or any other school
finance system, of concern to the children, parents, educators, taxpayers,
and the courts, are: (1) the effect upon the equalization of available re-
sources; (2) the effect upon community capability to meet locally-perceived
needs; and (3) the effect upon property tax rates.
A. The Optimum Balance Test
One approach to the evaluation of a school finance system is to
determine whether or not there are adequate revenues for all necessary
school services. This would require, however, a detailed analysis of the
complex formulas used to allocate foundation program funds and categorical
aids. While this approach may be appropriate for skilled school finance
system designers and the legislatures they advise, it is clearly an impractical
test for determining the constitutionality of a given financing system.
75
74. See notes 5-10 and accompanying text supra.
75. A "judicially unmanageable controversy" would be presented. Mclnnis v. Shapiro,
293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Il1. 1968), aff'd mem. sub nom. McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322(1969);
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Fortunately, there is another way. Of the three types of revenues
available to school districts, the foundation program, categorical aids, and
local supplements, the first two are equally available to all school districts
according to need as determined by the lawmakers. Only the third type,
local supplements, is not equally available to all districts. The relative
amount of school revenue of this unequal type, expressed as a percent of the
state's total school revenue, thus provides an index of the extent to which
public school revenue is equalized in the state. Assuming that the quality of
education is a function of fiscal considerations, such an index provides an
objective measure of the relative weights given by the state school financing
system to equal educational opportunities and to local participation in school
fiscal affairs. This approach also directly confronts the problem of making
an appropriate accommodation of the competing interests of furnishing
equal educational opportunities and of maximizing local fiscal control. The
technique provides a useful monitoring device by which optimum balance
can be preserved between these values.
76
This criterion77 for an "optimum balance" of equalized and une-
qualized revenues responds directly and fully to the issues of the equaliza-
Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F.Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969), aff'd mem., 397 U.S. 44 (1970). The
Serrano I court disagreed with the Mclnnis and Burruss opinions on this point. 5 Cal. 3d at 615,
616 & n.33, 617-18, 487 P.2d at 1263, 1264 & n.33, 1265, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 623, 624 & n.33, 625.
76. For example, assume that the judicial branch determines that a 90%10% ratio (90%
equalized funds, 10% unequalized funds) is the optimum balance. Assume further that for
several years the lawmakers set the foundation programs sufficiently high and provided suffi-
cient categorical aid funds so that the exercise of local fiscal control in meeting locally-
perceived additional needs did not cause the unequalized local supplements to exceed the 10%
limit. Assume, however, that after a few years the lawmakers fail to appropriate sufficient state
funds for the foundation programs and categorical aids to keep pace with rising educational
costs, with the result that locally-perceived needs for more educational dollars cause the
unequalized local supplements to reach 12% of the total funds. Under these circumstances, the
courts could either redirect apportionments of state funds from advantaged wealthy districts to
disadvantaged poor districts, or could enjoin the expenditure of funds so as to require closing
the schools until the lawmakers corrected the situation. In New Jersey, both of these forms of
judicial relief were afforded when the lawmakers, who were parties to the suit, failed to
respond appropriately to the state supreme court's decision as to what were the necessary
provisions for a "thorough and efficient" system as specified in the state constitution. Robin-
son v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973), modified, 63 N.J. 196, 306 A.2d 65 (1973), aff'd,
67 N.J. 35, 335 A.2d 6 (1975) (in the last two decisions, the court declined to act until the
legislature first enacted a financing statute); Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 133, 351 A.2d 713
(1975) (ruled legislative enactment unconstitutional), modified, 69 N.J. 449, 355 A.2d 129 (1976)
(issued injunction pending full state funding of 1975 act), aff'd per curiam, 70 N.J. 155, 358
A.2d 457 (1976), amended, 70 N.J. 464, 360 A.2d 400 (1976) (injunction dissolved).
77. Credit for development of this criterion must be accorded Dr. Erick L. Lindman, a
nationally-recognized expert in public school financing, then professor at the Graduate School
of Education, University of California at Los Angeles. See E. LINDMAN, DILEMMAS OF SCHOOL
FINANCE (1975). Dr. Lindman testified for the defense at the Serrano trial. See text accompany-
ing note 35 supra.
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tion of available resources and of the capability of communities to meet
local needs. This test does not concern itself with the devices or formulas
used for resource allocation among the districts. It can apply to any resource
allocation system, so long as the various types of revenues received under
that system can be identified as being either "equalized" (i.e., funds
available to each and every district, without excessive taxation, regardless
of a district's community characteristics), or "unequalized" funds (i.e.,
supplementing funds raised by local taxation which are not equally available
to districts, depending upon their specific community characteristics). Thus
the "optimum balance" test measures a school financing system by its
results in terms of its effect on the equalization of available resources and on
local fiscal control.
To illustrate, assume that the legislature or the courts determined that
the optimum balance for total school revenues was not less than ninety
percent "equalized" funds and, accordingly, not more than ten percent
"unequalized" funds. Would California's foundation program system meet
this constitutional test?78 In the course of the trial proceedings in Serrano, it
was shown that the California foundation program operating in 1970-71,
just prior to the Serrano I decision, resulted in a balance of 76.4 percent
equalized and 23.6 percent unequalized revenues. 79 The reasons for this
78. The majority opinion in Serrano II asserts that the foundation program "revenues can
by no means be considered 'equalized' under defendants' own definition of that term." 18 Cal.
3d at 757, 557 P.2d at 945, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 361. This assertion is based on the fact that basic aid
districts are able to achieve their respective foundation program levels with a tax rate lower
than the computational tax rate (see Figure 3, page 461). Perhaps there is a semantic problem
here. As previously noted (see note 16 and accompanying text supra), each and every district
can achieve its foundation program without imposing an excessive tax rate; the foundation
program dollars are hard educational dollars, available to each and every district, and thus serve
the cause of equal education. Perhaps the term "universally available" funds would have
expressed these concepts more clearly. The court's conversion of foundation program "univer-
sally available" funds into "unequalized" funds is anomalous in view of its lack of concern
about disparities in property tax rates for the support of non-school governmental services (i.e.,
municipal overburden). Municipal overburden disparities far exceed the tax rate advantages
that are enjoyed by only a few of the California's most wealthy basic aid districts. For
example, in the 1973-74 school year, San Francisco could achieve its foundation program with a
tax rate of about $1.86, giving it a two dollar advantage over equalization aid districts. In that
same year, municipal overburden tax rates (considering only cities and counties) ran from a low
of $1.68 in unincorporated territory of Orange County to a high of $8.41 in the city of Isleton in
Sacramento County. Thus municipal overburden varied by as much as $6.73; San Francisco's
two dollar advantage in achieving its foundation program was in turn offset by its high
municipal overburden tax rate of $6.95. Since it is possible. to view municipal overburden as a
sharing of a school district's taxable wealth, it is obvious that disparities in municipal overbur-
den are an important cause of "district wealth-related" disparities in per-pupil expenditures;
yet Serrano II relegated the search for tax equity with respect to municipal overburden to the
legislature. 18 Cal. 3d at 759 n.38, 557 P.2d at 946 n.38, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 362 n.38.
79. See id. at 755 n.31, 557 P.2d at 944 n.31, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 360 n.31.
[Vol. 4
I'Vol. 4
imbalance are clear: the combined foundation program amounts and
categorical aids were too low to satisfy the perceived needs of the various
districts' constituents, who in turn provided large supplementation that
they considered necessary for proper education.
As a result of the passage of Senate Bill 90 and Assembly Bill 1267,
the foundation program amounts and categorical aids were dramatically
increased for the school year 1973-74 and for subsequent years. As a result
of these increases, the operation of the system in 1973-74 resulted in
approximately 89.6 percent equalized and 10.4 percent unequalized reve-
nues.8o This change in the ratio between equalized and unequalized reve-
nues, brought about by increases in the foundation and categorical aids
programs, highlights the importance of the numbers used in the various
program formulas. The structure of the formulas will not determine the
balance achieved; rather, the numbers used in the formulas will determine
the balance.
Similarly, the numbers used in a district power equalizing (DPE)
system would decide whether the system could pass the optimum balance
test. It is impossible to test the efficacy of a DPE system in equalizing
school resources and in accommodating the values inherent in local fiscal
control, however, until numbers have been inserted into its formulas and the
system has been in actual operation. In a simple DPE system, the state
would finance fully a basic level of support so that all districts would have
the same property tax rate in return for the same level of support. The
system would also provide for categorical aids to meet special needs per-
ceived by the state and federal governments. Beyond these subsidies, each
district could provide local supplements depending upon the financial capac-
ity of its constituents. If basic support and categorical aids are low and if
district power to raise local supplements is average, then the predictable
statewide response of each district's constituents will be to provide large
amounts of local supplements. These supplements would not, however, be
equally available to the districts, since they are dependent on community
characteristics other than district wealth"1 affecting the ability and willing-
ness of a district's taxpayers to provide additional funds.
80. Id.
81. The assumption that, under a DPE system, local supplements would be independent of
district wealth may in fact not be well-founded. As stated in the appellants' reply brief, "district
power equalizing, through the unequal incentives it would induce by its fiscal rewards and
penalties for local tax effort, would result in State-induced and supported inequalities in
educational programs. Thus, if the fulcrum of the 'power equalizing' is at the average district
taxable wealth, a 'poor' district of one-third the average per-pupil wealth could obtain $300,000
for a locally perceived program by raising only $100,000 by local taxation, whereas a 'wealthy'
district (or pupil-poor district, e.g., Alpine County and San Francisco) of three times the
average per-pupil wealth would have to raise $900,000 by local taxation in order to retain
Summer 19771 CASE OF MISSED OPPORTUNITIES
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
B. Optimum Balance v. Fiscal Neutrality
In contrast to the optimum balance test, Serrano l's criterion for
constitutionality in terms of equal educational opportunities and local par-
ticipation in school fiscal affairs is that a district's wealth may not influence
its spending. This test concentrates on the required structure of a constitu-
tional system rather than on the results to be achieved. The structure of a
district power equalizing system or any other allegedly fiscally neutral
system provides no assurance of either equality or adequacy of educational
opportunities, nor any guarantee of an appropriate regard for the value of
local fiscal control. The optimum balance criterion, on the other hand,
because it does concentrate on results rather than on structure, can provide
assurances of continued equality and adequacy of educational opportunities,
while simultaneously providing proper respect for the value of local fiscal
control. Should state levels of support fall too low, local electorates predict-
ably would provide larger local supplements causing a perceptible imbal-
ance that the court could then correct under this test.
In promulgating its declaratory relief criteria,82 the Serrano trial court
failed to address itself to two of the three key concerns: equalizing resources
and local fiscal control. This omission was caused by the trial court's focus
on the structure rather than on the operation and effects of the critical
numbers used in the financing formulas and in its exclusive focus on the
third concern, the financing system's effect on the ability of taxpayers to pay
taxes. The optimum balance criterion, on the other hand, addresses itself
directly to the two concerns ignored at the trial in Serrano; in fact, it is these
two vital interests of the people of California that the optimum balance
$300,000 for a similar locally perceived program. It is clear that the 'poor' district (especially if
it were a high-income suburban district) would be much more likely to obtain voter approval to
support the proposed program than would the 'wealthy' district. Under power equalizing, then,
we would still have 'wealth-related expenditures', but the expenditures would be inversely
related to district wealth (MAV/ADA). Instead of finding positive coefficients of correlation
between expenditures and district wealth, we would find negative coefficients, i.e., the higher
the 'wealth' of the district the less it would tend to spend for education. Would such 'inversely-
wealth-related' disparities in per-pupil expenditures be less offensive to California's equal-
protection-of-the-laws provisions than S.B. 90's 'wealth-related' disparities in per-pupil expendi-
tures?" Reply Brief for Appellants at 29, Serrano II, 18 Cal. 3d 728,557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr.
345 (1976) (emphasis added). In Serrano II, plaintiffs declined to defend DPE or any of the
other suggested district wealth-equalizing alternatives, claiming that "[s]o long as wealth is
removed as an influence on spending, the Legislature [will be] left free [by the trial court] to
design any system of its choosing." Brief for Respondents at 158, Serrano II, 18 Cal. 3d 728,
557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976). The Serrano II court also declined to consider the
constitutional merits of DPE or any other alternative system. 18 Cal. 3d at 775 n.54, 557 P.2d at
957 n.54, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 373 n.54. Since a DPE system, with its unequal incentive effects,
does not remove the influence of wealth on spending, it ironically fails to satisfy the very
"fiscal neutrality" test that gave birth to DPE. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
82. See Serrano II, 18 Cal. 3d at 749 n.21, 557 P.2d at 940, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
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test seeks to protect. The third concern of school financing vis- -vis taxes is
also satisfied, both in the requirement that in order for school revenue to
qualify as "equalized," they must be available to each and every district
without excessive tax rates, and in the requirement that supplements from
local taxes must be relatively small.
8 3
Thus, not only is the optimum balance test more logical and easier to
administer than the Serrano fiscal neutrality test, 84 but it is also a test that
can be applied to any state school finance system, so long as "equalized"
and "unequalized" revenues can be identified. Therefore the federal gov-
ernment could use it to encourage equalization of educational opportunity
within each of the states by requiring a specified optimum balance in order
to qualify for federal categorical aids.
85
Why then did the California Supreme Court fall to adopt this preferable
test? The answer to this question may perhaps be gleaned from portions of
83. "It may be noted that one of the beauties of the 'optimum balance' test is that it may
readily be applied to various classifications of districts in the system as well as to all the districts
in the system. Thus all urban districts, and all 'pupil-poor' rural districts could be examined as
groups to determine if their respective balances between equalized and unequalized revenues
were approximately the same as the statewide balance. The results of such studies could be
used to determine any need to make corrections in either the categorical aid programs for such
districts (e.g., urban districts) or the foundation programs for 'necessary small schools' with
their higher per-pupil costs. Thus the 'optimum balance' method can be used to continually
refine the process by which foundation program levels and categorical aid programs are
determined." Reply Brief for Appellants at 50 n.25, Serrano II, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135
Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976).
84. This is not to say that additional tests are precluded, such as one that determines the
percentage of average local supplements that the state's "key" low-wealth district would
raise with the statewide average tax rate for local supplementation (i.e., statewide total of local
supplements divided by statewide total of assessed valuation, for districts of the same type).
For example, the "key" low-wealth unified district in California is probably Baldwin Park,
which has about a third of the wealth of an average district. If equalized revenues for unified
districts comprise 90% of the total revenues, and unequalized local supplements comprise the
remaining 10%, Baldwin Park's per-pupil revenues would be 93 1/3% of the state average,
assuming an average local supplementation tax effort. (The "key" low-wealth district is the
state's lowest wealth district, excluding districts in which lower wealth is accounted for by tax-
exempt federal facilities for which Public Law 81-874 compensates the districts.) See text
accompanying notes 18-19 supra.
85. The federal government is moving in the direction of requiring equal educational
opportunity in the states. Thus, section 801 of the Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-380, 88 Stat. 484 (1974), provides: "Recognizing that the Nation's economic, political, and
social security require a well-educated citizenry, the Congress (1) reaffirms, as a matter of high
priority, the Nation's goal of equal educational opportunity, and (2) declares it to be the policy
of the United States of America that every citizen is entitled to an education to meet his or her
full potential without financial barriers." Section 842 of the same act provides for federal
assistance to states for development of school finance plans designed to achieve equality of
educational opportunity. It also directs the Commissioner to develop guidelines defining the
achievement of equal educational opportunity. See also 20 U.S.C.A. § 238(d)(2)(B)(West Supp.
1977) ("equal educational opportunity" requirements affecting allotment of Public Law 81-874
funds).
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the Serrano II opinion that exhibit certain judicial intuitions concerning
the rival tests for constitutionality. The court opined that the optimum
balance test "is less an alternative to the 'fiscal neutrality' approach of the
trial court than what turns out to be defendants' description of the system at
issue from the standpoint of its overall effect.''86 Perhaps this indicates a
sentiment on the part of the court that the optimum balance test was offered
more as an excuse for the existing system than as a sincere proposal for an
alternative criterion of constitutionality.8 7 If so, this is a misapprehension on
the part of the court; the defendants proposed the optimum balance test as a
test that must be applied to any system in order to assure equalization of
school resources while appropriately accommodating local fiscal control.
But a more crucial reason for the court's persistence in adhering to the
fiscal neutrality test may be inferred from the following excerpt from the
Serrano II opinion:
Under the system we here examine, however, the ability of a
school district to meet those problems peculiar to it depends in
large part upon the taxable wealth of that district per ADA. A
fiscally neutral system, if tailored in a responsive and responsible
way, would in no way resemble the specter which defendants raise.
Rather, it would make the individual district's ability to meet its
own particular problems connected with providing educational op-
portunity depend upon factors other than the wealth of the district,
and thus dissipate the discrimination which characterizes the sys-
tem before us.88
This clearly indicates a judicial belief that a properly designed, fiscally
neutral system will in fact reduce inequalities of educational opportunity
from district to district. Is there a sound basis for this belief? There probably
is some basis for this belief in the short term, particularly if the standard of
measurement of unequal education is based upon comparing a few of the
highest-spending districts against a few of the lowest-spending districts. In
the first few years of its operation, the legislative desire to do as little
damage as possible to the programs of some of the high-wealth and high-
spending districts8 9 will cause the legislature to infuse large sums of equaliz-
ing state money into the school system. But after the system has been in
operation for a few years, the foundation for the court's intuition crumbles.
When the competition between public education and other state governmen-
tal services for state tax dollars becomes normalized and state surpluses are
exhausted, the public schools can expect no greater share of the state
86. Serrano II, 18 Cal. 3d at 754, 557 P.2d at 943, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
87. This apparent suspicion of the California Supreme Court brings to mind Justice
Marshall's remark in the Texas school financing case "that the State's purported concern with
local control is offered primarily as an excuse rather than as a justification for interdistrict
inequality." San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 126 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
88. Serrano II, 18 Cal. 3d at 760, 557 P.2d at 947, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 363 (emphasis added).
89. E.g., the San Francisco, Oakland, and Long Beach unified school districts.
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treasury than they could expect under the present foundation program
system. Without the coercive effect of an optimum balance test, the law-
makers could readily neglect public schools in favor of other public institu-
tions, the consequence of which would be an increase in local supplements,
which will in turn lead to unequal education. The only predictable long-
range outcome of a "fiscally neutral" system is that there will be a new list
of high-spending and low-spending districts. The new list of high-spending
districts will be comprised of those districts with community characteristics
other than district wealth that favor the raising of local supplements.
It is, indeed, anomalous that the lawmakers are struggling to restruc-
ture California's vast school financing system to comply with Serrano at a
time when that system achieves a good balance between equal opportunity
and local fiscal control. The balance presently achieved by the California
system is probably one of the best in the nation; yet it alone, with one
exception, is deemed to deny equal protection of the laws.90 When Serrano
came before the California Supreme Court for the second time, the court had
a golden opportunity to establish a viable test for determining the constitu-
tionality of a state school financing system. In electing to adopt a standard of
so-called fiscal neutrality, the court allowed that opportunity to slip through
its fingers.
IV. The Second Opportunity Missed
The Serrano 11 court was also presented with an opportunity to estab-
lish criteria for the judicial scrutiny to be applied in state equal protection
cases. In this regard, it is clear that at least two highly valued but incompat-
ible interests were at stake, equal educational opportunity and local fiscal
control. It is also clear that each of these interests is afforded protection by
the California Constitution. 91 Both the trial court and the parties agreed that
neither of these important interests was to be treated as an absolute; rather,
the consensus was that the more vital of these interests, equal educational
opportunity, must to some extent defer to the less vital interest in local fiscal
control. The complexity 92 and importance of the issues at stake called for
90. On April 19, 1977, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that the state's school-
financing system violated equal protection guarantees of the state constitution. Meskill v.
Horton, summarized, 45 U.S.L.W. 2509 (April 19, 1977). The New Jersey system was held
invalid in Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973), modified, 63 N.J. 196, 306 A.2d
65 (1973), aff'd, 67 N.J. 35, 335 A.2d 6 (1975), because the legislature failed to "provid[e] for
the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system" as required by the state
constitution. 62 N.J. at 514, 303 A.2d at 294-95. The court rejected the suggestion that it apply
that state's equal protection clause to strike down the system. Id. at 492-501, 303 A.2d at 283-
87.
91. Equal educational opportunity finds protection in the equal protection provisions of
CAL. CONsT. art. I § 7, art. IV § 16. Local decision-making in fiscal matters finds protection in
CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 21.
92. The complexity of the system is not the result of a legislative attempt to obscure any
existing deficiencies. Rather, it results from the state's efforts to assure appropriate financial
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more subtle judicial tools than those provided by the either-or equal protec-
tion approach used with contrary results in both Serrano I and Rodriguez.
93
Despite the opinion expressed in Serrano 11,94 application of the traditional
rational basis test under federal standards would affirm even the pre-Senate
Bill 90 school financing system. 95 Is this proper? Surely a child's interest in
equal education is entitled to greater protection than this test affords.
If the traditional rational basis test is inappropriate, is the traditional
strict scrutiny test the only remaining judicial tool? This test shifts the
burden to the state, requiring it to demonstrate that the challenged legislation
is "necessary to achieve a compelling state interest." ' 96 In this respect,
Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Dunn v. Blumstein97 is pertinent:
In both cases some informed and responsible persons are
denied the vote, while others less informed and less responsible are
permitted to vote. Some lines must be drawn. To challenge such
lines by the 'compelling state interest' standard is to condemn them
all. So far as I am aware, no state law has ever satisfied this
seemingly insurmountable standard, and I doubt one ever will, for
it demands nothing less than perfection. 99.
Legislatures that represent communities with widely-varying and often
incompatible interests cannot realistically be expected to design perfect
products. In politics, the rule of compromise prevails. The judicial tool of
strict scrutiny is thus inappropriate in this area of complex and important
systems.
A. A Proposed Alternative
If the rational basis and strict scrutiny tests are both inappropriate tools
for analyzing school financing systems, what other methods are available?
Several judicial opinions prior to the Serrano I decision advocated a single,
flexible technique that could replace the two outmoded analytical devices
described. This technique may be labelled a "variable standard of review,"
or a "balancing test." It is a method that can be adjusted to account for all
resources to school districts with widely-varying community characteristics and, in turn, to
provide a similar quality of education to all children despite individual differences in education-
al need.
93. This very complexity was given by the United States Supreme Court in Rodriguez as a
reason to avoid utilization of the strict scrutiny test. 411 U.S. at 40-44. Accord, Robinson v.
Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 492-501, 303 A.2d 273, 283-87 (1975).
94. 18 Cal. 3d at 749 n.20, 769 n.49, 557 P.2d at 939 n.20, 953 n.49, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 355
n.20, 369 n.49.
95. "A century of Supreme Court adjudication under the Equal Protection Clause affir-
matively supports the application of the traditional standard of review, which requires only that
the state's system bear some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes." San Antonio
Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 41 (1973).
96. Serrano II, 18 Cal. 3d at 768, 557 P.2d at 952, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
97. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
98. Id. at 365 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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relevant factors in the case. Justice Marshall, in his dissenting opinion in
Rodriguez, described this technique as follows:
The Court apparently seeks to establish today that equal protection
cases fall into one of two neat categories which dictate the appro-
priate standard of review-strict scrutiny or mere rationality. But
this Court's decisions in thefield of equal protection defy such easy
categorization. A principled reading of what this Court has done
reveals that it has applied a spectrum of standards in reviewing
discrimination allegedly violative of the Equal Protection Clause
This spectrum clearly comprehends variations in the degree of care
with which the Court will scrutinize particular classifications, de-
pending, I believe, on the constitutional and societal importance of
the interest adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of
the basis upon which the particular classification is drawn. I find in.
fact that many of the Court's recent decisions embody the very sort
of reasoned approach to equal protection analysis for which I
previously argued-that is, an approach in which "concentration
[is] placed upon the character of the classification in question, the
relative importance to individuals in the class discriminated against
of the governmental benefits that they do not receive, and the
asserted state interests in support of the classification.' '99
The supreme courts of New Jersey and Oregon have both found the
traditional approach to equal protection review inadequate in the school
financing area. The Oregon Supreme Court has stated:
We prefer the approach made by the New Jersey court in
Robinson v. Cahill.'0 Its approach could be termed a balancing
test. Under this approach the court weights the detriment to the
education of the children of certain districts against the ostensible
justification for the scheme of school financing. If the court deter-
mines the detriment is much greater than the justification, the
financing scheme violates the guarantee of equal protection ....
Ultimately, a court must weigh the nature of the restraint or the
denial against the apparent public justification, and decide whether
the State action is arbitrary. In that process, if the circumstances
sensibly so require, the court may call upon the State to demon-
strate the existence of a sufficient public need for the restraint or
the denial . . . . This is a combination of the two-step analysis
used by the [United States] Supreme Court. How important is the
interest impinged upon,-educational opportunity, as balanced
against the state objective in maintaining the present system of
school financing,-local control?'0
99. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting) (citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520-21 (1970) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting)).
100. 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1975).
101. Olsen v. State of Oregon, 276 Ore. 9, 20, 554 P.2d 139, 145 (1976). The California
Supreme Court recently observed that "the standard [of judicial review] applicable under the
Fourteenth Amendment as it has evolved in the federal courts, appears as a curious hybrid,
variously characterized as 'strict rationality' (Berkelman v. San Francisco Unified School Dist.,
501 F.2d 1264, 1269 (9th Cir. 1974)), or 'rational scrutiny' (Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971
Term, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 21 [1972]). The most recent pronouncement on the applicable
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In the wake of Serrano I, Professor Goldstein advocated a refined version of
this same approach. 10 2 He contended that each basis of the legislative
classification should be examined regarding its relationship to each reason
for denominating an affected interest "fundamental." 103 For example, the
courts would not only inquire into the relationship between school district
per-pupil expenditures and the quality of education, but would also examine
the influence of "district wealth-related" expenditures, where the legisla-
tive classification being examined is grounded on district wealth, on the
additional educational benefits purchased.
B. Application of the Alternative Test
The "balancing test" is a tool that could have been effectively
applied to the issues raised in Serrano 11. By adopting this test, the court
would not have been faced with the necessity of validating the school
financing system if the legislative classification of districts by wealth were
found to have only some rational relationship to the state's legitimate
interest in local fiscal control. Instead of labeling classifications as suspect
or interests as fundamental, the court could have weighed the detriment to
the education of a child living in a district that is unable or unwilling to
provide for sufficient local supplements against the ostensible justification
for the state's scheme of school financing. If the court had determined that
the detriment is greater than the justification, only then would the financing
system have been found to violate the guarantee of equal protection.
Under this balancing test, the pre-Senate Bill 90 system should have
failed because the educational detriment to children in the most disadvan-
taged districts was too great when weighed against the ostensible justifica-
tion of local fiscal control; the most disadvantaged districts had equal access
to only 76.4 percent of average per-pupil revenues. On the other hand, the
post-Senate Bill 90 system should have passed constitutional muster, be-
cause all districts had access to 89.6 percent of average per-pupil revenues.
In spite of these differences between the pre-Senate Bill 90 and post-Senate
Bill 90 systems, the court in Serrano 11 treated them as the same. That is,
since both systems involved a suspect classification that affected a funda-
federal standard is contained in Craig v. Boren, supra, [429 U.S. 190, 197], in which the high
court announced that statutory sex classifications are acceptable only when they further
'important governmental objectives' and are 'substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives.' "Arp. v. Worker's Comp. Appeals Bd., 19 Cal. 3d 395, 400, 563 P.2d 849, 851, 138
Cal. Rptr. 293, 295 (1977). The six opinions in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), indicate the
unsettled views of the Supreme Court as to the standard or standards of judicial review to be
applied in equal protection cases.
102. Goldstein, Interdistrict Inequalities in School Financing: A Critical Analysis of Ser-
rano v. Priest and Its Progeny, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 504 (1972).
103. Id. at 519.
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mental interest, the court concluded that both systems triggered strict judi-
cial scrutiny. Under this approach, a newly-improved foundation program
system would probably receive strict scrutiny even if its equalized revenue
constituted ninety-five percent of the total revenue. On the other hand, the.
traditional rational basis/strict scrutiny technique would validate any school
financing system in which the structure is such that the judiciary cannot
label it "suspect," regardless of the extent to which it may actually deny
equal education.
Conclusion
The court in Serrano If was faced with complementary opportunities,
but let both slip away without clear resolution of the problems. The equal
protection balancing test would have weighed educational detriments
against the justification of local fiscal control by examining the operational
results of the system. This is also what the optimum balance test would have
done. This latter test would have weighed the educational detriment against
the values inherent in local fiscal control and required that an optimum
balance be achieved. One can only hope that the next time the California
Supreme Court has the opportunity to determine the validity of a state school
financing program, it will have the courage to turn its back on the outmoded
and inadministrable techniques it relied on in Serrano H and will instead
utilize the optimum balancing test and the variable balancing standard in its
equal protection analysis.
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